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The Limits of Modernization:  
American Development Assistance 




Die amerikanische Entwicklungskooperation mit südostasiatischen Staaten während der fünfzi­
ger Jahre ist Thema dieses Beitrags. In einem ersten Teil werden die ideellen und institutionellen 
Grundlagen amerikanischer Entwicklungspolitik beleuchtet. Anschließend werden deren re­
gionale Prämissen diskutiert. Schließlich geht der Beitrag näher auf die amerikanische Entwick­
lungspolitik gegenüber Indonesien und Süd­Vietnam ein. Die Beispiele machen das Bemühen 
deutlich, südostasiatische Länder mit Hilfe von Entwicklungspolitik im Sinne amerikanischer 
Modernisierungsvorstellungen zu verändern. Deutlich werden aber auch die Möglichkeiten 
südostasiatischer Staaten, diesen Modernisierungsprojekten enge Grenzen zu setzen. Der Bei­
trag ordnet sich damit in neuere Interpretationen des Kalten Krieges als einem perizentrischen 
System ein, das kleineren Akteuren erhebliche Handlungsautonomie zuspricht.
This article deals with U.S. development policies towards Southeast Asia during the 
1950s. I begin with a discussion of the institutional and ideological origins of develop-
ment cooperation in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Then I will briefly comment on 
the evolution of American development policies towards Southeast Asia in the 1950s. 
The third part of the article discusses strategies and projects of development assistance 
in two countries of the region, non-aligned Indonesia and western-oriented South Viet-
nam. Both countries were important for the United States for two reasons: Indonesian 
independence had come about partly with the assistance of American diplomacy, and 
Washington had high hopes for the successful integration of the country into the “Free 
World” by means of development cooperation. Like Indonesia, South Vietnam, a client 
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state of the United States from 1954 on, serves as an example of the limits regimes set to 
American efforts at penetrating and reshaping societies in the Third World.1
Following World War II, the United States created an “empire by invitation” in Europe.2 
The Marshall Plan and NATO stabilized war-torn Western Europe and integrated the 
countries economically and in terms of security. American policies, however, were not 
only meant to contain communism and induce economic development. Equally impor-
tant were transfers of norms and values such as democratic procedures, social norms, and 
business administration techniques. Occupation policies in Japan were geared towards 
comparable objectives.3 Nationalist revolutions in the Southern hemisphere – first in 
Southeast Asia, the Near and Middle East, and later in Africa – projected American 
transformation policies on a global scale. With the demise of European empires the 
United States felt it needed to prevent power vacuums in emerging nations.4 
American perceptions of the Third World were conditioned by belief systems which can 
be summarized as follows: a teleological view of the nation’s history as a universally appli-
cable model of linear, evolutionary progress; a deep distrust of revolutions and a prefer-
ence for gradual transfers of power in the colonial world as well as continued cooperation 
between Europe and the newly-independent countries; and the conviction that cultural 
variations legitimized the belief in the superiority of Europeans and white North-Ameri-
cans over Asians, Latin Americans and Africans. With few exceptions, decision-makers 
 For the broader picture, see David C. Engerman / Corinna R. Unger, eds., Towards a Global History of Moderniza­
tion. Special Issue of Diplomatic History 33.3 (2009), 375­52.
2 Geir Lundestand, The American “Empire” and other Studies on U.S. Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective, 
Oxford 990, 37.
3 Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan. America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 97–952, 
Cambridge 987. See also Volker Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe. Shepard Stone 
Between Philanthropy, Academy and Diplomacy, Princeton, NJ, 200; Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion: 
American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 99–933, Ithaca, NY, 98, 67­83; Anselm 
Doering­Manteuffel, Wie westlich sind die Deutschen? Amerikanisierung und Westernisierung im 20. Jahrhun­
dert, Göttingen 999; Jessica Gienow­Hecht, Transmission Impossible. American Journalism as Cultural Diplo­
macy in Postwar Germany, 95–955, Baton Rouge, LA, 999; Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s 
Advance Through Twentieth­Century Europe, Cambridge, MA 2006; Felicitas Hentschke, Demokratisierung als 
Ziel der amerikanischen Besatzungspolitik in Deutschland und Japan, 93–97, Münster 200; Walter L. Hix­
son, Parting the Curtain. Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 95–96, New York 997; Michael Hochge­
schwender, Freiheit in der Offensive? Der Kongress für kulturelle Freiheit und die Deutschen, München 998; 
Gilbert M. Joseph / Catherine C. Legrand/Ricardo D. Salvatore, eds., Close Encounters of Empire. Writing the 
Cultural History of U.S.­Latin American Relations, Durham, NC, 998; Scott Lucas, Freedom´s War. The American 
Crusade against the Soviet Union, New York 999; Richard Pells, Not Like Us. How Europeans have loved, hated, 
and transformed American culture since World War II, New York 997; Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American 
Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 890–95, New York 982; Frances Stonor Saunders, The 
Cultural Cold War. The CIA and the Worlds of Arts and Letters, New York 999; Axel Schildt, Zwischen Abendland 
und Amerika. Studien zur westdeutschen Ideenlandschaft der 50er Jahre, München 999, 398­23; Frank Schu­
macher, Kalter Krieg und Propaganda. Die USA, der Kampf um die Weltmeinung und die ideelle Westbindung 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 95–955, Trier 2000, 223­275; Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca­Colonization and 
the Cold War. The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War, Chapel Hill, NC, 
99.
 David Ryan / Victor Pungong, eds., The United States and Decolonization, Power and Freedom, London 2000 and 
David D. Newsom, The Imperial Mantle. The United States, Decolonization, and the Third World, Bloomington, ID, 
200.
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in Washington felt that non-European peoples could not effectively govern themselves 
immediately and that due to scientifically identifiable defects of non-European cultures, 
emerging nations in the Third World needed tutelage. Since the European powers could 
not perform these duties any more because their rule was discredited and opposed, the 
United States had to perform the task of assisting in nation-building efforts.5 
Transformation policies came to be guiding principles of America’s relations with the 
Third World.6 Transformation operated on many levels, ranging from the individual to 
the national, from rural areas to urban conglomerates, and from small ethnic groups to 
multi-cultural states. Modernization, its underlying rationale, operated within a set of 
doctrines based on Western standards and experiences.7 American foreign policy pro-
moted transfers of norms and values, of modes of behavior, and tried to establish in-
stitutions in Third World countries which would form nuclei of modernization, such 
as development agencies, planning offices, tax systems, American-trained police forces, 
parliaments etc. Transformation policies had all the ingredients of a civilizing mission 
– its aim being to convince Third World peoples that capitalism was a “coherent and 
attractive philosophy”.8 It proceeded from the assumption that the competence to mod-
ernize “backward” or “traditional” societies was not simply self-assumed but politically, 
morally and scientifically justified.9
This hegemonic project operated with a number of instruments. Alliances were formed 
to integrate newly-independent countries strategically. Police assistance was designed to 
promote internal order and stability. Information and propaganda campaigns were con-
ducted to effect ideological affiliation, orderly transfers of power and regime stability. 
They also promulgated individual and social hygiene, birth control, nuclear families and 
specific gender roles.10 A highly important tool to project norms and standards became 
development policy. 
Development policies in the contemporary meaning of the term had been initiated on a 
modest scale already by the colonial powers – France, Great Britain and the Netherlands 
– at the turn from the 19th to the 20th century.11 After the First World War, the League 
of Nations institutionalized development aims in the mandate system.12 These early de-
  5 For a more detailed exploration of this theme, see Marc Frey, Dekolonisierung in Südostasien. Die Vereinigten 
Staaten und die Auflösung der europäischen Kolonialmächte, 930–96, München 2006, chap. 7
  6 The theoretical background of transformation is well­discussed in Wolfgang Merkel, Systemtransformation. Eine 
Einführung in die Theorie und Empirie der Transformationsforschung, Opladen 999.
  7 I find Robert Packenham´s distinction between doctrines and theories useful. See Robert A. Packenham, Liberal 
America and the Third World. Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science, Princeton, NJ, 973, 
xvii, ­8.
  8 “We Are Learning to Live With Asia”, Speech by Harlan Clevelands at the Far East­America Council of Commerce 
and Industry, New York, 20 October 950, NA, RG 69, Entry 59, Box 26, F FE General 3.
  9 For a comparable assessment, see Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire, London 200.
0 Marc Frey, Tools of Empire: Persuasion and the U.S. Modernizing Mission in Southeast Asia, in: Diplomatic History 
27 (2003), 53­568.
 David Fieldhouse, The West and the Third World. Trade, Colonialism, Dependence and Development, London 
999, 27­22.
2 Anthony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge 200; Susan Peder­
son, Back to the League of Nations: Review Essay, in: American Historical Review, 2:  (Oct. 2007), 09­7.
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velopmental policies, however, came to a halt during the 1930s, mainly as a result of the 
Great Depression and the efforts of European powers to maximize the potential of the 
colonies in order to strengthen metropolitan economies. Following World War II, the 
United States built on these efforts and promoted development issues both within the 
newly-founded United Nations as well as on a regional and bilateral level.13 
In the formative phase of American development policies, decision makers in Washing-
ton perceived development to have a “global” and a “total” dimension. It should “reach 
every corner of the world”, and it was conceived as an integrationist strategy encompass-
ing political, psychological, economic and military requirements.14 American develop-
ment policies in the 1950s aimed at transforming the colonial and post-colonial world 
by means of an ideational, material and technological resource transfer. It predicated 
an evolutionary model of progress and a universal paradigm of societal development 
based on the history of European capitalism. Embedded in development doctrines was 
an interpretation of past, present and future, whose central component was a globalized 
concept of transformation: the linear development of underdeveloped territories towards 
stable, prosperous nations. This teleology had two major implications. It provided prin-
ciples of organization for the modernization and transformation of colonial and post-
colonial societies. But it also called for accelerated development and for a compression of 
time. In view of the Cold War, strategies and instruments had to be devised to speed up 
the transformation process. While the evolution from feudal agrarian societies towards 
industrialized, capitalist societies in Europe had taken centuries, the specter of commu-
nism necessitated almost instant “impact”. 
Early American development policies were not based on distinctive theories but on doc-
trines shared by decision-makers. These doctrines were the result of dominant percep-
tions of the non-European world, of the experience of the New Deal and Marshall Plan, 
and of the input of social science research, whose focus turned increasingly towards the 
Third World during the 1950s. Race as a defining category of human development had 
been thoroughly discredited by the Holocaust, and anthropological research conducted 
during the interwar period had led to the hypothesis that culture, and not race, seemed 
to be responsible for the varying degrees of development.15 This did not mean, however, 
that hierarchies did not persist. Concepts of culture superseded notions of development 
based on ethnic variations. Climate, cultural distinctions, traditions and religion were 
regarded as inhibiting factors of modernization. Euro-American culture was perceived 
as dynamic, open to change, technology-friendly and capitalist-minded, while Asian 
cultures (with the exception of Japan) seemed static, corrupted by despotism, and unre-
sponsive to change from within Asian societies themselves. 
3 Olaf Stokke, The UN and Development. From Aid to Cooperation, Bloomington, ID, 29­30.
 International Development Advisory Board, Partners in Progress. A Rockefeller Foundation Report, Washington 
95, . 
5 Carl Degler, In Search of Human Nature. The Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought, New 
York 99, 59­0.
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A second influence on early American development doctrines was the New Deal experi-
ence.16 With its combination of ideas about free markets, liberal capitalism and limited 
state intervention, the “New Deal synthesis” aimed at the free exchange of goods, capital 
and services, coupled with the establishment of national and international institutions 
which promoted market forces. According to the New Deal synthesis, economic devel-
opment necessitated the corporatist cooperation of the various actors of society, the or-
ganization of transnational networks, the modernization of the means of production, the 
adoption of American business administration techniques and tax reforms, and it called 
for the creation of a broad middle class. Thus, for example, the Civilian Conservation 
Corps of the 1930s was promoted as a model of youth organization, identity formation, 
and nation building vis-à-vis Southeast Asian governments.17 The belief in the utility 
and applicability of the New Deal synthesis remained very much alive well into the 
1960s. President Johnson’s April 1965 offer to finance a Mekong development scheme 
embodied all the ingredients of the New Deal synthesis: Modeled on the Tennessee Val-
ley Authority of the 1930s, the project not only envisaged energy production and the 
taming of nature. The scheme also called for new and better housing, schools, jobs and a 
general improvement of living conditions and quality of life.18 This integrated approach 
was reflected in community development programs, with which American experts ex-
perimented in India, Taiwan, Laos or Vietnam.19 But social engineering was not the only 
legacy of the New Deal. New Deal institutions served as models for the Economic Co-
operation Administration, responsible for the administration of the Marshall Plan and 
development in European colonies. Finally, many early development experts who came 
to deal with Southeast Asia had gained experience within the ECA or in connection with 
the Reconstruction program in China.20 This expert knowledge was complemented by 
6 I draw on Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan. America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 97–
952, Cambridge 989, 27 f. and passim.
7 Harry Kahn to Shannon McCune (both ECA), 27 September 950, NA, RG 69, Entry 59, Box 28, F FE Indochina.
8 David Ekbladh, “Mr. TVA”: Grass­Roots Development, David Lilianthal, and the Rise and Fall of the Tennessee Val­
ley Authority as a Symbol for U.S. Overseas Development, 933–973, in: Diplomatic History 26 (2002), 335­37; 
Milton Osborne, The Mekong. Turbulent Past, Uncertain Future, New York 2000, 90­93.
9 Nick Cullather, “The Target is the People”: Representations of the Village in Modernization and National Security 
Doctrine, in: Cultural Politics 2 (2006) : 29­8.
20 John Blum (Director, ECA­Mission Paris 98–950, 950 Director ECA Mission Saigon); Robert W. Barnett (State 
Department member of the interministerial Far Eastern Commission, Japan, 95–99, Chief, China Economic 
Divison, State Department 99–950); Leland Barrows (Assistant to the Special Representative in Europe, ECA, 
and leader of various missions to Vietnam 950–958); Harlan Cleveland (specialist for economic warfare, United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administrator in China 92–98, director, China aid program, ECA 98, 
head of the department of Southeast Asian Affairs, ECA 98–952, Assistant Director for Europe, Mutual Secu­
rity Agency, 952–953); Samuel P. Hayes (92–95 in various functions for the Foreign Economic Administra­
tion and the State Department, chief, Special Technical and Economic Mission Indonesia 95–952, Assistant 
Director, MSA, Far East 952–953); James P. Hendrick (official in the ECA 98–953 and Director, MSA­Program 
in Hanoi 953); John D. Sumner (Economic Advisor of the Embassy in China, 9–95, member of the Indus­
trial Mission, ECA, China, 98, economic advisor to the ECA mission in China 98–99, economic advisor in 
Indonesia 950). See inventories, Hendrick Papers and Sumner Papers (HSTL); Richard W. Barnett Oral History 
Interview, February 976, HSTL; Leland Barrows Oral History Interview, January 97, ibid.; Samuel P. Hayes Oral 
History Interview, July 975, ibid.
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scholars from the social sciences who were commissioned to write studies on the econo-
mies and societies of Southeast Asia.21 
A third influence on early American development policies were British and American 
economists who from the 1940s theorized on development issues in Europe and beyond. 
Influenced by Keynesian theories on economic growth, experts were united in their as-
sessment that growth of the gross national product was the ultimate aim of development 
as well as its chief indicator. By the mid-1950s, sociologists and political scientists en-
tered the debate about development. They perceived modernity as a syndrome of change 
characterized by industrialization, urbanization, alphabetization, education and commu-
nication. They shared the belief that economic growth was a fundamental prerequisite of 
development. However, they assumed that economic progress would lead to democratic 
structures and would serve as the most effective means to prevent the spread of com-
munism.22 These hypotheses implicated a call for a comprehensive transfer of norms 
and values from the United States to Third World countries. Development policies thus 
assumed the quality of a strategy for the establishment of an informal empire – of a 
sphere of influence in which Southeast Asian societies were controlled by a set of norms 
and rules which guaranteed a modernization defined by American standards and system 
compatibility. Development policies were an essential component of the American civi-
lizing mission.
Perhaps the most influential expert on development policies during the 1950s and 1960s 
was the economic historian and government adviser Walt Rostow. His theories corrobo-
rated the doctrines of decision makers, and appealed to a large audience. Building on his 
research on the industrialization of Western Europe, Rostow suggested a development 
theory which promised universal applicability and modernization along European and 
Western models.23 Already in 1954, however, he advised the Central Intelligence Agency 
2 “Report Prepared by Dr. John F. Embree on a Trip he Made through the Kingdom of Laos, French Indochina”, John 
Hamlin (Consul Saigon) to Department of State, 3 March 98, NA, RG 59, 85G.00/3­38; “Cultural Cautions for 
US Personnel Going to South East Asia”, John F. Embree, 5 March 950, ibid., RG 69, Entry 5, Box 20, F Public 
Relations 950.
22 See Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future. Modernization Theory in Cold War America, Baltimore 200. See also 
the anthology by Gerald M. Meier, ed., Leading Issues in Development Economics. Selected Material and Com­
mentary, New York 96, and subsequent updates. Cf. Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, eds., International 
Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge, Berkeley, CA, 997; 
Mark T. Berger, The Rise and Demise of National Development and the Origins of Post­Cold War Capitalism, in: 
Millenium: Journal of International Studies 30 (200), 2­23; Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development. The 
Making and Unmaking of the Third World, Princeton, NJ, 995; Irene L. Gendzier, Managing Political Change: 
Social Scientists and the Third World, Boulder, CO, 985; Michael Latham, Ideology, Social Science, and Destiny: 
Modernization and the Kennedy­Era Alliance for Progress, in: Diplomatic History 22 (998), 99­229; idem., Mod­
ernization as Ideology. American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era, Chapel Hill, NC, 2000, 
2­68 and passim; Colin Leys, The Rise and Fall of Development Theory, Bloomington, ID, 996; Christopher 
Simpson (Hrsg.), Universities and Empire. Money and Politics in the Social Sciences during the Cold War, New 
York 998.
23 Walt W. Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth, New York 952, and, of course, his famous The Stages of 
Economic Growth. A Non­Communist Manifesto, New York 960.
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to promote development policies as the most appropriate instrument for growth in and 
affiliation of Third World countries with the West:
Taking a longer view, we, in common with virtually all the peoples of the world, have 
an overwhelming interest in the development of world conditions which will free security 
from dependence on military strength. Where men’s energies can be turned constructively 
and with some prospect of success to the problems of expanding standards of living in a 
democratic framework we believe the attractions of totalitarian forms of government will 
be much reduced. In the short run communism must be contained militarily. In the long 
run we must rely on the development, in partnership with others, of an environment in 
which societies which directly or indirectly menace ours will not evolve. We believe the 
achievement of a degree of steady economic growth is an essential part of such an envi-
ronment.24
Rostow’s creed, soon to be widely known as “modernization theory”, was that develop-
ment was “feasible”. Development evolved in a linear process, and the transfer of re-
sources (knowhow, technology and capital) would result in growth and a global adoption 
of democratic procedures. 
American decision makers felt that development policy had to “show that democracy is 
the best way for the realization of economic progress and political freedom”.25 Develop-
ment economist and ECA-specialist on Indonesia, John Sumner, stated: “What we seek 
to build are attitudes, institutions and ability to solve problems on a self-supporting, 
continuing basis.”26 The envisaged process of transformation necessitated an influx of 
foreign investment, capital accumulation, industrialization, planning, technical coopera-
tion, land reforms, and agricultural development programs. Moreover, it stipulated an 
appreciation of capitalism as a positive system of values by nationalist elites. Develop-
ment aid was meant to show that Western capitalism was no longer the “predatory capi-
talism” of colonial days but a “coherent and attractive philosophy”. Capitalist ideology 
would not only induce economic progress but also “good government”.27 
The aim to establish democratic procedures was soon discarded. By the end of the 1950s, 
the President’s National Security Council stated:
A number of reasons centering on cultural traditions, religion, and the burden of living 
explain the decline of Asian democratic institutions. There can be no real democracy 
in countries where the preponderant majority is illiterate, cannot express an intelligent 
2 “Notes on Foreign Economic Policy”, Max F. Millikan and Walt W. Rostow to Allen Dulles, 2 May 95, in: Simp­
son, ed., Universities and Empire, 39­55, quote on .
25 “Policies of Point Four. Guide Lines for Administration of the Act for International Development”, International 
Development Advisory Board, 5 June 953, Truman Papers, Central Files, Roll 9.
26 “The Problem Before us in Asia”, draft memorandum by John Sumner, undated [June 950], HSTL, Sumner Pa­
pers, ECA Files, Box 5, F General Memos and Reports, 950–5.
27 “We Are Learning to Live With Asia”, Speech by Harlan Cleveland to the Far East­America Council of Commerce 
and Industry, New York, 20 October 950, NA, RG 69, Entry 59, Box 26, F FE General 3.
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choice between democratic values and Communist blandishments, accepts a fatalistic or 
quietist religion, recognizes authoritarianism as the traditional way of life, and is too 
enmeshed in the struggle for survival to have time or energy for individual self-develop-
ment. The crisis confronting a backward society during the modernization process is so 
profound that authoritarian controls and disciplines are required to guide the revolution 
on stable course. We must accept these facts.28
While the transfer of “democratic values” and “human rights” as an ultimate aim was 
not abandoned in principle, authoritarian regimes came to be regarded as being better 
suited to steer “backward” economies and societies through the “revolution of rising 
expectations”. This applied in particular to military regimes. They were considered to 
possess qualities no other institution in newly independent countries had. They seemed 
better organized, commanded technical know how, and supplied a variety of specialists. 
And they were seen as the best available bulwarks against communism. This reason-
ing, already promulgated for quite a long time by observers in the region, legitimized 
American support for military regimes in Southeast Asia and beyond in a dual sense. 
Superpower competition and the Cold War framework provided one justification for 
support. Yet, now assistance to military regimes assumed a progressive-humanist quality, 
since military outfits seemed best equipped to effect societal modernization. Hardly ever 
did decision makers reflect on the fact that it had been the United States who had built 
up military forces in the first place. Small wonder that Washington felt most comfortable 
with actors they themselves had elevated to power. This neglect of their own role in the 
genesis of military rule in Third World countries rationalized the already existing military 
assistance programs and legitimized continued support in the future.
The aim to transfer norms and values in either a democratic context or in a development-
oriented authoritarian state-building scheme could only be realized by a “top-down ap-
proach”.29 Several reasons were responsible for this: First and foremost was the common 
aim of both the donor and recipient to strengthen governmental institutions and make 
them more efficient. Secondly, development was closely linked to regime legitimacy. 
While the United States had an interest to bolster non-communist regimes, Southeast 
Asian governments needed economic success to make good the promises given dur-
ing independence struggles. (With regard to sovereign Thailand, things were different, 
but here as well ruling elites had to demonstrate that their close alliance with the US 
28 “Political Implications of Afro­Asian Military Takeovers, Summary of Conclusions”, Marion W. Boggs (Director, 
Policy, NSC) to NSC, 2 May 959, NA, RG 273, Mill Papers, Box ; “Political Implications of Afro­Asian Military Take­
overs”, undated paper of discussion, National Security Council [Ramsey], June 959, ibid., RG 59, Entry 35, Box 
5, F Afro­Asian Affairs. President Eisenhower agreed with the findings of the paper: “He [Eisenhower] did wish to 
state that Mr. Ramsey’s report was the finest report which he had ever heard given before the National Security 
Council”. Memorandum of Discussion at the 0th Meeting of the National Security Council, 8 June 959, in: 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 958–960, Vol. 8: East Asia­Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Washington 
992, 97­02.
29 “Proposal for a Longer­Range Program of Aid to Asia”, Memorandum by Cleveland, 3 November 950, NA, RG 59, 
Lot 58D258, Box 6.
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had overall positive effects). Thirdly, critical agents of modernization like a middle class, 
entrepreneurs, labor leaders or women leaders were lacking or were perceived as being 
unsuited for cooperation (Europeans and overseas Chinese). Fourthly, the problem of 
interference in domestic affairs was an ever-present one. Cooperation with government 
agencies was therefore a sine qua non. 
A number of fact-finding missions toured Southeast Asia in 1950. Their brief encoun-
ters with the complex realities of life in Southeast Asia allowed for tentative analyses of 
the situation: debt peonage of a significant part of the rural population on Java and in 
Thailand; exorbitant land leases and corvée in large parts of Vietnam; a dramatic shortage 
of textiles in Java and insufficient supply of basic tools; a significant percentage of the 
populations infected by malaria, ranging from 30 to 90 percent; a high child mortality of 
up to 50 percent (in the case of Laos); structural malnutrition on the densely populated 
islands of Java and Madura. Life expectancy in Southeast Asia was at a medium of 32 
years; in Western Europe and North America the corresponding figure was 64.30 Statis-
tics, though not very reliable and based upon sketchy information from various sources, 
revealed great discrepancies between the industrialized world and Far Eastern countries. 
Per capita income in selected countries in 1946 was stated as follows: China $ 23, Indo-
nesia $ 35, Thailand $ 41 [1948], India $ 43, the Philippines $ 88, Ceylon $ 91, Japan 
$ 100, Great Britain $ 660, the United States $ 1269.31 Reports emphasized the strong 
need for capital transfers and know how. Colonialism and the cultural disposition of the 
peoples were identified as reasons for low standards of living, widespread poverty and 
subsistence farming. 
With regard to Europe, ECA officials had identified the lack of foreign currency as the 
main impediment to economic growth. In Southeast Asia, however, observers encoun-
tered a completely different setting: some sectors of the economy did not participate 
in monetary circulation, credit institutions were missing, and the infrastructure was 
deficient. Autochthonous capital formation was insufficient, planning institutions and 
reliable statistics were lacking. Moreover, there was a great need for the development 
of entrepreneurial classes and for norms and rules congruent with capitalist systems in 
a variety of societal sectors. Discussions about the need for a Marshall Plan for Asia 
surfaced regularly during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. However, top 
decision makers continuously argued against such a concerted effort on two grounds: 
economically, it seemed unclear whether Southeast Asian countries could utilize rela-
tively large amounts of aid (“absorptive capacity”); politically, it was felt that Congress 
30 “Report of Visit of Agricultural Officer to North Vietnam, October ­2,950”, Robert Blum to ECA, 30 October 
950, NA, RG 69, Entry 237, Box 8, F French Indochina, Agriculture; Blum to ECA, 28 February 95, ibid., F 
Indochina Agriculture, Land Development; “Health Program”, ECA Memorandum, 6 May 952, ibid., Entry 236, 
Box 2, F Health; “Diversification of Indonesian Economy”, Foreign Operations Administration Memorandum, 
undated [30 December 953], DDEL, NSC, OCB, CFS, Box .
3 “Postwar Regional Economic Problems of the Far East”, Preliminary Version, Office of Intelligence Research OIR 
Report no. 5028, Division of Research for Far East, Department of State, 25 August 99, NA, RG 69, Entry , 
Box 2, F Far East, Economic Conditions; “ECAFE Study on Thai Financial Institutions”, 3 March 950, ibid., Entry 
59, Box 26, F Far East General.
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and the American taxpayers would not support such a program.32 To be sure, Truman’s 
Point Four program of 1949 held out the prospect of long-term development efforts 
by the United States. The President’s message raised high expectations, but it obscured 
rather than clarified the range of problems associated with early American development 
policies.33 
U.S. Economic Assistance to Southeast Asia, 1950–1961 (in million Dollars)34
Burma Indonesia Malaya Philippines Thailand Vietnam
1950 – 137,7 – 137,9 – –
1951 10,4 8,0 – 138,8 8,9 21,9
1952 14,0 8,0 – 132,4 7,2 24,7
1953 12,8 13,2 – 20,8 6,5 25,0
1954 –1,8 4,5 – 14,8 8,8 25,0
1955 –1,0 7,2 0,3 30,0 46,8 322,4
1956 17,0 88,2 0,5 47,9 33,5 210,0
1957 1,3 12,3 0,4 42,8 35,0 282,2
1958 44,2 29,0 0,1 29,1 30,9 189,0
1959 8,9 67,6 20,2 145,2 45,7 207,4
1960 –2,6 70,2 0,3 23,4 24,6 181,8
1961 0,4 31,6 0,4 86,0 26,1 152,0
Total 103,6 477,5 22,2 849,1 274,0 1641,4
The vagueness and ambivalence of the Point Four program was paradigmatic for Ameri-
can development policies in Southeast Asia during the 1950s. They were multi-causal 
and multi-functional. While social and economic factors like poverty alleviation, market 
integration and regional interdependence (Japan, Europe, and Southeast Asia) were both 
motivating factors and long-term aims of development, its ultimate rationale and chief 
purpose was security. The mix of political / military and social / economic reasons and 
32 The debate is covered in part by Burton I. Kaufman, Trade and Aid. Eisenhower´s Foreign Economic Policy 953–
96, Baltimore 982.
33 “Objectives and Nature of the Point IV Program”, Under Secretary’s Meeting, 2 February 99, NA, RG 59, Lot 
58D609, Box ; Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 99, Washington 963, 
­6. See also Gilbert Rist, The History of Development. From Western Origins to Global Faith, rev. and expan­
ded ed. London 2002, 69­79.
3 Figures for Vietnam include Cambodia and Laos until mid­95. Sources: “Negotiating Paper. Singapore Con­
ference, Defense of SEA”, Steering Group on Preparations for Talks between the President and Prime Minister 
Churchill, 2 January 952, HSTL, TP, PSF, General File, Churchill­Truman Meetings, Box 6, F Far East Problems; “A 
Summary of Total U.S. Aid for the Associated States of Indochina from FY 950­FY 95”, STEM and MAAG Saigon 
to Mutual Security Agency, 26 October 953, NA, RG 69, Entry 32, Box 7, F Programs FY5; Douglas C. Dacy, 
Foreign Aid, War, and Economic Development. South Vietnam, 955–975, Cambridge 986, 200, and Robert 
J. McMahon, The Limits of Empire. The United States and Southeast Asia Since World War II, New York 999, 
Appendix 2.
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aims of development as well as the initial lack of coherent theories of development in 
Third World countries was largely responsible for the rather chaotic evolution of Ameri-
can development programs in Southeast Asia. Country programs varied greatly over the 
course of the 1950s, at times emphasizing agricultural projects over industrialization 
(and vice versa), state planning over private initiatives (and vice versa), and so forth.
 Indonesia: Development Policies in the Context of Structural Problems  
and the Cold War
The economic challenges facing the Indonesian governments following the transfer of 
independence in 1949 were remarkable.35 Per capita income in the early 1950s was con-
siderably lower than in 1939. Due to the devastations of World War II and the struggle 
for independence in the post-war period, output had not corresponded to population 
growth, and labor had moved from productive sectors to low-productive subsistence 
farming. Indonesia thus needed to grow fast, to industrialize, and to invest heavily. Basi-
cally, economic development was conditioned by four factors: (1) the colonial legacy 
and the government’s efforts to accommodate foreign, mainly Dutch, business interests 
with the needs of a sovereign economy; (2) the disparate economic requirements and 
potentials of the parts of the archipelago; (3) harmonization of needs and demands of 
various social actors; and (4) the world market and the decline of the price of raw ma-
terial following the Korean war boom. Due to the primacy of political over economic 
aims, Indonesian economic policy during the 1950s exacerbated rather than assuaged 
the problems arising out of these complex factors. 
Until the expropriation of Dutch businesses in 1957, the Indonesian economy per-
formed quite well, with per capita incomes rising on an annual basis of about 3.4 per-
cent. But a political climate increasingly resentful of foreign investment and Chinese 
businesses made Indonesia an unattractive place to invest. Indonesianiasi – a policy to 
provide for indigenous ownership and transfer of management to indigenous experts 
– led to further disinvestment. Government development planning was sketchy from 
the start, and the various development plans devised during the 1950s remained largely 
35 On the Indonesian economy in the 950s, see Anne Booth, Growth and Stagnation in an Era of Nation Building: 
Indonesian Economic Performance from 950–965, in: Thomas Lindblad, ed., Historical Foundations of a Na­
tional Economy in Indonesia, 890s–990s, Amsterdam 996, 0­20; idem, The Indonesian Economy in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. A History of Missed Opportunities, London 998, 53­72, 6­2, 6­68, 
222­227, 3­38; Howard Dick / Vincent J. H. Houben / J. Thomas Lindblad / Thee Kian Wie, The Emergence of 
a National Economy. An Economic History of Indonesia, 800–2000, Leiden 2002, 70­93; J. Thomas Lindblad, 
Foreign Investment in Southeast Asia in the Twentieth Century, London 998, 03­06; John O. Sutter, Indone­
sianasi: Politics in a Changing Economy, 90–955, Ithaca, NY, 959, 695­230; Jeroun Trouwen, Indonesia´s 
Foreign Policy and Trade, 957–965: Economic Reorientation versus Political Realignment, in: Piyanart Bunnag / 
Franz Knipping / Sud Chonchirdsin, eds., Europe­Southeast Asia in the Contemporary World: Mutual Images and 
Reflections 90s–960s, Baden­Baden 2000, 73­88; Thee Kian Wie, Economic Policies in Indonesia During 
the Period 950–965, in Particular with Respect to Foreign Investment, in: Lindblad, ed., Historical Foundations, 
35­330.
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unexecuted. By the early 1960s, it was clear to foreign and Indonesian observers that eco-
nomic policies had failed to convince, that the investment climate had deteriorated and 
that foreign investments (with the exception of the oil sector) had collapsed. Set against 
the background of these developments, it is difficult to assess whether a sustained, well-
coordinated American development assistance program could have generated long-term 
economic growth. But with the small funds allocated to Indonesia and the Cold War 
context looming, American efforts could not have the desired effects. 
Until the mid-1950s, American development policies in Indonesia were targeted towards 
five sectors: agriculture, public health, support for small businesses and consumer indus-
tries, development of big technical projects, and public education. During the second 
half of the decade, infrastructure projects as well as commodity exports (agricultural 
surpluses) became more and more important.
American Development Aid to Indonesia 1950–196036
Sektors in Mill. $ Percent Percent of loans and credits 
Infrastructure 107,5 23,0 92
Industry and Energy 55,7 11,8 88
Agriculture 46,8 10,4 70
Education and Public Administration 16,3 3,4 –
Security 11,1 2,3 –
Health 24,2 5,1 –
Agricultural Surplus Exports 148,3 31,7 100
Others (consumer goods etc.) 57,4 12,3 –
Total 467,3 100 72,4
A basic feature of early development efforts was the principle of “jointness”. From the 
start, however, cooperation between Indonesian officials and American development ex-
perts was complicated by a number of issues. In principle, the Indonesian government 
and media welcomed American efforts. But the presence of white Americans – in the 
early fifties there were about 50 experts operating in Indonesia – was widely perceived 
as a post-colonial, paternalistic variant of the traditionally asymmetrical relations be-
tween Indonesians and Europeans. While American technical experts avidly advised the 
Indonesian government to speed up planning, Indonesian officials urged them to take 
the challenges associated with nation building into account and to conduct develop-
ment “in our own good time”, and not in American-defined stages.37 Highly problematic 
36 Raymond B. Allen (Director, USOM Jakarta) to ICA Washington, 7 March 960, NA, RG 69, Entry 6, Box 8, F 
Indonesia Program Briefing. Due to different accounting systems, one also finds a figure of about  billion Dol­
lars in the literature. 
37 “Indonesian Attitudes Toward American Programs of Assistance”, DRF­DR­22, Division of Research for Far East, 
Department of State, 3 April 95, NA, RG 59, Lot 58D25, Box 5.
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was the American demand that Indonesian economic policies should conform as much 
as possible to the (American-defined) global economic system. This, however, operated 
under conditions detrimental to an economy largely dependent on the export of a few 
raw materials (rubber, tin, and oil). Decreasing prices for raw materials from 1952 sig-
nificantly reduced room for financial maneuvering and the ability to generate capital for 
investment in development projects. In view of decreasing state revenues and increasing 
allocation of funds to non-productive sectors (mainly the army) American prescriptions 
to create a friendlier climate for foreign investment were more and more perceived as 
intrusive. By the end of the 1950s, both the Indonesian government and the media at 
large associated American development efforts with handouts. 
Between 1949 and 1954 the United States provided Indonesia with $ 160 millions in 
development assistance. Resource and knowhow transfers, however, could not generate 
sustained growth. The amounts transferred were insufficient, competition by Indonesian 
planning and distribution agencies harmed efficiency, programs could not be executed 
successfully due to unforeseen problems. For example, Javanese farmers could not pur-
chase subsidized fertilizer because the price was still far too high. A motorized fishing 
fleet lay idle because of a lack of mechanics. Drugs did not reach their destination be-
cause of insufficient distribution systems. 
By mid-1954, both Jakarta and Washington saw the need for a new initiative regard-
ing development and financial assistance. Inter-ministerial planning groups within the 
Eisenhower administration came to the conclusion that Indonesia needed more assis-
tance and that new donors like Japan or Western Germany had to shoulder a substantial 
part of the burden. But conflicting interests within the administration and between the 
administration and Congress made development planning on a long-term basis virtu-
ally impossible. Moreover, following Communist gains in the Indonesian parliamentary 
elections in 1955, Washington became increasingly alarmed about the prospect of a 
communist take-over of Indonesia. From that time on, American development planning 
with regard to Indonesia virtually came to a halt. Superpower confrontation insured 
that some prestige projects, mainly in infrastructure, received continued attention. But 
other than that, American development policies now came to be substituted by agricul-
tural surplus exports (PL 480) which did not generate any developmental impulses. By 
1961, the newly-elected Kennedy-Administration was no longer prepared to “subsidize 
the status quo”.38
A number of reasons, both endogenous and exogenous, were responsible for the meager 
results of American development policies in Indonesia: an adverse economic climate, a 
primacy of political considerations, yearly Congressional appropriations which made 
long-term planning virtually impossible, and a lack of consistency on the part of the 
American and Indonesian governments to allocate funds to key projects and specific 
sectors of the economy. Underlying these factors, however, were conflicting views of the 
38 “Indonesian Problems”, Memorandum of a discussion with the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio at the 
State Department, 2 April 96, NA, RG 59, 798.00/­26.
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role of government within the economy. What was equally important was the fact that 
American advisory efforts were increasingly regarded as neo-colonialist prescriptions. 
American development cooperation in Indonesia thus largely failed not only because 
of structural impediments or domestic political and economic choices. Development in 
self-defined time frames, economic nationalism (Indonesianasi) or unattractive invest-
ment laws reflected Indonesian efforts to channel and restrict aspects of the American 
civilizing mission they deemed unsuited for the creation of a national economy and a 
nation state based on indigenous Indonesian sets of rules and norms.
Vietnam: A Bifurcated Response to Development Assistance
Between 1954 and 1961, the United States pumped about $ 1.5 billion economic aid 
into South Vietnam. In addition, the client state received some $500 million in mili-
tary aid. Towards the end of the 1950s, when South Vietnamese per capita income was 
roughly $ 140 annually, almost 20 percent was attributable to American transfers. Ini-
tially conceived as a “holding operation” to stabilize the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, 
American development experts assisted in the development of the South Vietnamese 
economy from 1955. In the second half of the decade, growth rates were quite remark-
able (about 7 % annually). These were mainly the result of a temporary state of political 
stability and of American goods and capital transfers rather than of self-sustained growth. 
Growth and stability were the ingredients which were supposed to turn South Vietnam 
into a showcase of the West.39
Two factors inhibited the realization of this aim from the beginning on. First, by 1958 
the deteriorating security situation made development practically impossible. Second, 
there was a wide discrepancy between American and South Vietnamese approaches to 
development. Conflicting ideologies increasingly paralyzed development initiatives, and 
in 1961/62 development as a fundamental aim of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis South 
Vietnam was disbanded altogether. At that time, Ngo Dinh Nhu, brother of Diem and 
chief adviser of the President, characterized the American-South Vietnamese relation as 
a “clash of cultures”. As no other aspect of bilateral relations, conflicts over development 
revealed the limited extend of America’s influence in the country. The United States did 
stabilize the Diem-regime, create institutions and promulgate development initiatives. 
But it could not control Diem, effect changes in institutional behavior or gain control 
over the implementation of specific projects and programs.40 
For Diem and Nhu – as for all Southeast Asian leaders – development did not simply 
mean economic growth. The regime aimed at a broad transformation of society. It envis-
aged a transformation from a predominantly agrarian economy to a corporatist society 
39 Douglas C. Dacy, Foreign Aid, War, and Economic Development. South Vietnam, 955–975, Cambridge 986, 
56 and passim.
0 This argument is in part based on Philip E. Catton, Diem’s Final Failure. Prelude to America´s War in Vietnam, 
Lawrence, KS, 2002.
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with a diversified economy, functioning national institutions and a nationalist ideology. 
Basic propositions of the regime – “Personalism, community and collective progress” 
– implied that development was a multifunctional instrument of modernization. ‘Per-
sonalist’ modernization, however, did not much have in common with an American-
sponsored one. Diem and Nhu were convinced – again like many other Southeast Asian 
leaders – that neither capitalism nor communism provided suitable models for the devel-
opment of South Vietnam. Both strongly disliked communist models of development, 
but they also disliked capitalist ones, since they regarded capitalism as the driving force 
of colonialism. Diem and Nhu favored a “third way” informed by personalist ideology.41 
In practice, South Vietnamese development policies were imbued with authoritarian, 
sometimes even totalitarian notions. While American experts in South Vietnam regarded 
economic and social development as a prerequisite for the establishment of democratic 
and liberal-capitalist structures, Diem was interested in creating a corporatist state held 
together by an authoritarian leadership. 
American development efforts were in part geared towards short-term aims such as re-
settlement of refugees or relief programs. In order to check inflation, it provided mecha-
nisms for the absorption of large capital transfers by the small South Vietnamese econo-
my. According to the functionalist logic of “spill-over” effects, another basic aim was the 
establishment of institutions and the transfer of rules and norms to a variety of political 
institutions and economic sectors. Advisory functions proceeded from the assumption 
that institution building would, over the long term, lead to behavioral changes of indi-
viduals which in turn would lead to the establishment of “good government”.42 
While institutional reforms reflected a “top-down approach”, land reform – a much 
desired object of American development policies in the 1950s – reflected “bottom-up ap-
proaches”. This holistic notion of national development eventually formed the basis for 
theories of “nation building”, a term which began to dominate American development 
discourses from the early 1960s on. Nation building, in the words of Karl Deutsch, was 
an “architectonic or mechanistic model” which helped to create “independent, relational, 
politically organized autonomous and internally legitimized systems”.43 Modernization 
and modernization theory provided the functional instruments for conducting “nation 
building”. Conditions for this transformation process seemed nowhere more promising 
than in South Vietnam. French rule had been thoroughly discredited, an anti-colonialist 
and anti-communist outlook had taken hold of the regime, and the lack of expertise and 
resources demanded an extensive advisory capacity as well as the distribution of develop-
ment assistance. 
After 1955, a range of American institutions and their employees were engaged in trans-
forming South Vietnam. A case in point was the Michigan State University Vietnam Ad-
 Vu Van Thai, Vietnam’s Concept of Development, in: Wesley R. Fishel, ed., Problems of Freedom. South Vietnam 
Since Independence, East Lansing, MI, 96, 69­73.
2 Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration. A Sociological Interpretation, New York 957, 3­56 and pas­
sim.
3 Karl Deutsch / William J. Foltz, eds, Nation Building, New York 963, 3,  f.
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visory Group, which reorganized the police and public administration.44 However, while 
the group was able to create institutions analogous to American models, it was unable 
to effect changes in individual and institutional behavior. Curricular contents aiming at 
decentralized hierarchies and individual responsibility were increasingly criticized by the 
regime until in 1962 Diem asked the group to pack up and go. 
Another central feature of American development efforts was land reform, and here, 
again, conflicting ideas about approaches as well as implementation soon paralyzed the 
whole program. Land reform was an essential requirement of successful transformation, 
since it generated individual freedom as the basis for collective freedom. Thus declared 
Wolf Ladeijnsky, since the 1930s a capacity on land reform: 
Poverty, hunger, disease, and the lack of opportunity for self-development have been the 
lot of the overwhelming majority of the people in underdeveloped countries. What is new 
about this poverty is that it has become a source of discontent, and an overworked and 
overexploited common man who for centuries was inertly miserable is now alertly misera-
ble. Now the forces that keep the peasant within well-defined bounds are breaking down 
under the impact of what has been aptly termed “the revolution of rising expectations”. 
… Changes in land tenure arrangements will enhance the political power of the peasants 
and very possibly endow them with rights and responsibilities resembling those of the 
rural people in a democratic society. …[P]opular support in Asia is peasant support or 
nothing. An owner cultivator or a reasonably satisfied tenant would acquire a stake in 
society. He would guard that society against extremism.45
But American prescriptions about land titles, distribution, rents, agrarian credit societies 
and so forth fell on deaf ears with a regime that was basically interested in maximizing 
its control over the rural population. The Saigon regime’s version of the land reform sup-
ported the interests of large farmers and of the government itself. Eventually, it became 
clear that land reform, as Diem and Nhu understood it, was principally designed to 
reduce French influences over the economy.46 
The American-South Vietnamese conflict over land reform was symptomatic for the rela-
tion between superpower and client. Comparable developments occurred in connection 
with the creation of credit institutions, investment programs, macroeconomic planning, 
 “Monthly Report of the Michigan State University Team”, Edward W. Eisner (Chief Advisor) to Leland Barrows, 0 
August 956, NA, RG 69, Entry 32, Box 3, F Correspondence FY 955­56; “Civil Police Administration Program”, 
Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group,  May 957, ibid., Box , F Defense; Aspects of Modern 
Public Administration, course manuals by the Michigan State University, December 956, ibid., Entry 30, Box , 
F Public Admin. See also John Ernst, Forging a Fateful Alliance: Michigan State University and the Vietnam War, 
East Lansing, MI, 998.
5 Ladeijnsky to Kenneth Iversion (Ford Foundation), undated [November 95], in: Agrarian Reform as Unfinished 
Business. The Selected Papers of Wolf Ladeijnsky, ed. Louis J. Walinsky, New York 977, 20­2.
6 “Group Meeting of Big Landlords of South Vietnam”, Ladejinsky to Barrows, 8 March 955, NA, RG 59, 85G.6/3­
2555; “Land Reform”, Barrows to Harold H. Rhodes, 2 May 957, ibid., RG 69, Entry 32, Box 2, F Program 
Policy Committee. See also William Henderson, “Opening of New Lands and Villages: The Republic of Vietnam 
Land Development Program”, in: Fishel, ed., Problems of Freedom, 23­38.
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the tax system and all kinds of laws pertaining to the economy. To the growing anger of 
American experts, the regime was little interested in creating a market economy. Instead, 
it followed a policy of economic nationalism aimed at the exclusion of French and ethnic 
Chinese influence.
By the end of the 1950s, neither the Eisenhower-Administration nor the Diem-regime 
had a coherent development policy. South Vietnamese officials saw “advice” increasingly 
as “control”, and accordingly openly or covertly torpedoed American initiatives.47 By 
that time, it had become evident that the Diem-regime was informed by an ideology 
quite distinct from what Americans believed in, and that South Vietnam successfully 
repudiated vital elements of the American prescriptions and programs.
Conclusion
I have tried to show that American development policies in the late 1940s and 1950s 
aimed at the transformation of societies in an all-encompassing way. Development poli-
cies were a central ingredient of American foreign relations. It postulated a linear, evo-
lutionary development from “traditional” to “modern” societies, and it operated on the 
assumption that the United States provided the standards that needed to be adopted. 
Both Indonesia and South Vietnam pursued policies of economic nationalism which 
tended to channel, restrict or exclude aspects of this hegemonic project. The leeway 
of local actors in determining national approaches to development was considerable. 
Instead of nation building, the United States promoted state building. By the end of the 
1950s, optimistic assumptions about the feasibility of transfers of norms and values had 
given way to unqualified support for military establishments and authoritarian regimes. 
This was legitimized in a double sense: the Cold War context, and the assumption that 
military regimes were best qualified to lead Third World countries on the road to mod-
ernization.
7 “The State of the Nation – Educationally”, Charles J. Falk (Ecudation Division, USOM) to Barrows, 8 May 956, NA, 
RG 69, Entry 32, Box 3, F Director´s Correspondence FY 955­56.
